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SECTION 9-307(1): THE U.C.C.'S OBSTACLE TO
AGRICULTURAL COMMERCE IN THE OPEN
MARKET
John F. Dolan*
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code' provides a general open market
rule in the Secured Transactions article which permits certain good faith
purchasers to take goods free of perfected security interests. That general
rule, however, excepts from its application sales of farm products by
persons engaged in farming operations. Defenders of the exception prof-
fer two justifications. Some feel that farm producers would not find
ample credit if farm lenders faced the possibility of losing collateral to
buyers. Others argue that the exception enjoys widespread support among
state legislatures and among the federal agencies which account for a
significant share of agricultural credit. Thus, this second argument
continues, adoption of a rule in the Code which treats farm sales in the
same fashion as it treats nonfarm sales would invite deviation from the
Code rule by both state and federal systems with a resulting loss of
uniformity.
This article holds first, that the farm exception grows out of archaic
notions of agriculture and agricultural finance; second, that the exception
is basically unfair in that it penalizes unwary buyers who reasonably
expect they will buy free of security interests; third, that the exception
creates uncertainty and thereby increases transaction costs to the detri-
ment of farm producer and farm lender; and fourth, that the farm excep-
tion itself has so contributed to a lack of uniformity that its abrogation
could hardly cause more.
DEFINING THE ISSUE
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code takes pains to differ-
entiate four classes of goods: 2 consumer goods, equipment, farm prod-
* LL.B., University of Illinois, 1965; Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State Univer-
sity.
I The Uniform Commercial Code is hereinafter cited as "Code." Unless otherwise
noted, all section references are to the 1972 official version of the U.C.C., and references to
the comments are to those prepared by the sponsoring agencies to the 1972 version.
2 U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h) sets forth the general definition of "goods". Hereinafter all
U.C.C. section numbers will be referred to by section number only.
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ucts, and inventory.3 This differentiation facilitates disparate treatment of
each of the four categories. Consumer goods,4 for example, are free from
certain filing requirements which attend other classes of goods5 and are
subject to different foreclosure rules. 6 These rules arise out of the notion
that the nature of consumer transactions justifies treatment different from
that afforded transactions in a commercial setting.7
Similarly, the Code makes allowance for the inherent dissimilarities
between "equipment," which the Code defines to include assets used by
a business,8 and "inventory," which it defines to include assets the
business holds for sale or lease or otherwise consumes.9 The methods of
financing these two classes of goods and, more importantly, the probabil-
ity of selling one and the improbability of selling the other1° justify their
different treatment in connection with the relative priorities of lenders"
and the protection of persons who buy such goods. 12
THE FARM PRODUCTS CATEGORY
Equipment and inventory are similar to the extent that both are
owned for profit or commercial purposes as opposed to the domestic
purposes of personal, family, and household uses. There remains, how-
ever, a category of goods and which comprises a significant element of
commerce but which Code drafters could reconcile with neither the fish
of commerciality nor the fowl of domesticity. That specially treated class
consists of farm products.
3 Section 9-109(l) to (4).
4 Consumer goods include those goods "used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes." Section 9-109(1).
5 Section 9-302(1)(d).
6 See §§ 9-504(3), 9-505(l) to (2), 9-507(1).
7 Cf. § 2-104, Comment 1 (special rules for merchants).
8 Section 9-109(2). The definition also serves as a catchall. See § 9-109(2), Comment 5.
9 Section 9-109(4). The important distinction between inventory and equipment appears
to be one of duration. Materials used by the business and consumed by it are inventory,
whereas machines used or consumed by it are equipment. Compare § 9-109(4) with § 9-
109(2).
10 Courts have concluded that the term "inventory" in a security agreement includes
after-acquired inventory because "inventory by its nature and definition changes from day
to day." In re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (S.D. Fla.), aff'dpercuriam,
448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971).
11 Compare § 9-312(3) with § 9-312(4). See generally § 9-312, Comment 3.
12 Although the buyer protection rule of § 9-307(1) does not use the term "inventory," it
is clear that this class of goods is the kind to which the section is directed. See §§ 9-307(1), 1-
201(9), and 9-102, Comment 5. Cases have tended to hold, true to academic consistency but
perhaps contrary to the expectations of the parties, that buyers of "equipment" do not
benefit from buyer protection rules. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442
(10th Cir. 1976) (sale of used aircraft by airline not subject to products liability rule);
Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970)
(sales of vehicles held for lease, though technically inventory, not subject to the § 9-307(1)
rule).
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Farm products, by definition, must be in the possession of a farm-
er, 13 yet the rules which apply to them affect all who deal in agricultural
commodities. Clearly, farm products include what would otherwise be
inventory: crops, livestock, and the raw materials of farm production, as
well as the products both of crops and livestock in their "unmanufactured
states." 14 This definition leaves by implication those products which are
in their manufactured states (e.g., leather or com flakes) and which are
not his "equipment" as the farmer's only "inventory." 15 In short, with
that sole exception for manufactured state inventory, farmers can hold no
inventory in the Code sense. They can only hold "farm products."
SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR FARM PRODUCTS
Having constructed this farm products (inventory-which-is-not-
inventory) category, the Code drafters fashioned special rules for it. The
first concerns the filing requirements, and the second concerns the rela-
tive priorities of a secured inventory lender and a purchaser in a subse-
quent inventory sale.
The first difference is in filing requirements. Section 9-401 poses
three filing options for lenders secured by farm products. The first
requires central filing; the others require local filing. The Code drafters
did not choose among the three options, but an overwhelming majority of
the jurisdictions have opted for either the second or the third. Because
only five states 16 require central filing for farm products, in nearly all
jurisdictions the filing of financing statements covering farm products
will be local, with buyers or lenders searching for such financing state-
ments at the county or town level.
The filing options, however, must rank as a relatively minor con-
sideration and are not the reason for the creation of the separate farm
products class of goods. Code drafters could have effected the local filing
option for farm products in the fashion they effected it for farm equip-
ment. Such equipment is not by definition a separate class of goods but
13 Section 9-109(3). The Code wisely eschews the term "farmer" for the terms "debtor
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations." It thereby avoids the
problem of determining whether, for example, a stock broker can be a farmer.
14 Id.
15 A farmer's equipment (assuming of course that livestock are not equipment) falls into
the "equipment" category of goods. See § 9-109(2).
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-401(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 9-
401(1) (1975); HAw. REV. STAT. § 490:9-401(1) (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9401(1) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-78); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-401(l) (1968). California, Maine, and
Oregon require central filing for livestock, though not for other farm commodities. CAL.
COM. CODE § 9401(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 9-401(1)(a) (West
Cum. Supp. 1976-77); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.4010(1) (Oregon Digest 1977). A Montana pre-
Code statute requires the secured party to notify the Montana Department of Livestock.
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 52-319 (Smith 1977). See generally Batey Land & Livestock Co.
v. Nixon, - Mont. -, 560 P.2d 1334 (1977).
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falls into the section 9-109 definition of "equipment." However, the
Code provides two options for local filing of "equipment used in farming
operations," 17 even though generally a financing statement covering
equipment would be filed centrally.18
The second area of different treatment concerns the rights of the
lender and the subsequent purchaser of inventory. Where either farm or
nonfarm inventory is involved, section 9-306(2) often in practice oper-
ates to terminate the creditor's interest in inventory after that transfer.
That section provides:
[A] security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale,
exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or other-
wise ....
Because lenders recognize that the purpose of inventory is sales, that a
need to perform a filing search inhibits sales, and that sales free and clear
of the lender's interest serve the purposes of lender and borrower alike,
almost all lenders customarily authorize inventory sales. In effect, then,
lenders and their borrowers fashion a private open-market rule through
their security agreement which authorizes sales free of the lender's
security interest. 19
This willingness by lenders to authorize sales of secured inventory
stems only in part from the protection afforded the lender by the proceeds
which arise from that sale. 20 Inventory lenders often do not make inven-
tory loans with the expectation that they will receive proceeds from each
sale. Such expectations, while inherent in any discrete, short-term loan,
are inconsistent with the indispensable notion of working capital loans of
intermediate term secured by inventory. Rather, inventory lenders often
make such loans on the assumption that borrowers will utilize proceeds of
sale to acquire new inventory and will reduce the working capital loan not
as a result of discrete sales but as a consequence of capital needs and cash
flow. 21
In those infrequent situations where the inventory lender does not
authorize sale, section 9-307(1) fulfills the expectations of the buyer in
17 Section 9-401(l). The second and third alterative subsections lump "equipment used
in farming operations" with "farm products" for the purpose of determining the proper
place to file.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973).
20 Section 9-306(l) defines proceeds as "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."
21 The discrete lien approach stemmed from the commercial loan theory of banking,
popular before the 1930's, that all loans must be self-liquidating. The modern banking
doctrine, developed in the 1940's and 1950's, of measuring a bank's liquidity in terms of all
loans, not just discrete loans, permits commercial lenders to justify the revolving loan so
indispensable to inventory finance. See generally L. RITTER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF
MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 102-03 (2d ed. 1977).
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ordinary course by imposing the open-market rule by operation of law.
That section provides that a buyer in ordinary course of business other
than a person buying farm products from a farmer "takes free of a
security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected . . . . " By carving out the exception for farm sales, the Code
exempts those sales from the open-market rule of section 9-307(1).
Significantly, however, the Code does not exempt them from the practi-
cal open-market effect of section 9-306(2), which operates only in the
event the secured party authorizes the sale in the security agreement "or
otherwise."
Most farm lenders do not authorize such sales in the security agree-
ment, and most courts, though not all, have read the "or otherwise"
language of section 9-306(2) narrowly. Accordingly, the effect of the
farm products exception is to impose a strict security of property rule and
to refuse the benefit of open-market precepts to sales comprising a
significant measure of commercial activity-agricultural sales.
In brief, local filing is not the only impetus for the separate classifi-
cation of "farm products." That impetus also derives from a far more
significant policy choice favoring security of title over commercial celeri-
ty. Since the law of sales as manifested in the "buyer in ordinary course"
rules has traditionally struck this balance on the side of commercial
celerity, it is necessary to examine the history of, and evaluate the
rationale for, this departure in sales involving farm products.
UNIQUE FEATURES OF AGRICULTURAL LENDING
The history of agricultural financing parallels that of the commercial
sector with three notable exceptions. First, the mechanization of agricul-
ture tended to occur later than that of other industries. 22 While require-
ments for credit are no less pressing in agricultural enterprises than in
other businesses, 23 these requirements did not develop contemporane-
22 Commentators seem to agree that it has been only in the last 40 or 50 years that the
agricultural industry has demonstrated a marked need for other than real estate financing.
See Bunn, Financing Farmers: Existing Kansas Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 2
KAN. L. REV. 225 (1954); Bunn, Financing Farmers: Existing Wisconsin Law, The Green
Giant Case and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1954 Wis. L. REV. 357; Hawkland, The
Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the U.C.C.-Part I: Financing the Farmer, 76 CoM.
L.J. 416 (1971). See generally A. NELSON, W. LEE, &W. MURRAY, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE
308-11 (6th ed. 1973).
23 Statistics indicate that credit requirements are real indeed and are increasing at a rapid
rate. One authority estimates that in a ten-year period capital requirements for the "typical"
cash grain farm in the corn belt increased from $97,000 to $203,000 and for the "typical"
southwest cattle ranch from $141,000 to $205,000. See Hearings on the Effect of Corporate
Farming on Small Business Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm.
on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1968).
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ously with those of other businesses. 24 More importantly, the primary
source of farm collateral prior to and during the initial stages of agricul-
tural mechanization was land, which then was the farmer's single most
valuable asset.25 Finally, the nation's romantic preoccupation with the
"yeoman farmer ' 26 fostered a paternalistic attitude on the part of courts
and lawmakers toward farmers. 27
All three of these exceptions resulted in treatment of agricultural
credit needs disparate from that of the rest of the economy. Generally, the
factor's lien acts and the Uniform Trusts Receipt Act, both of which were
passed to facilitate secured inventory lending in other sectors of the
economy,2 8 did not cover agricultural transactions.29 Rather, agricultural
lenders were forced to resort to the chattel mortgage statutes30 with their
kinship to the familiar real estate mortgage. 3 1
Pre-Code rules of inventory financing reflect these historic differ-
ences. Pressure had exerted itself in nonagricultural settings to foster
inventory financing which permitted buyers to take free and clear of the
lender's encumbrance. 32 Pre-Code buyers from farmers, however, did not
enjoy that protection, because the chattel mortgage statutes did not extend
it.33 Buyers of farm commodities from persons other than farmers, how-
24 The technological revolution in agriculture began in earnest when in 1917 the use of the
horse reached its zenith. See generally E. HIGBEE, FARM AND FARMERS IN AN URBAN AGE 7-
44 (1963); Brake, A Perspective On Federal Involvement In Agricultural Credit Programs, 19
S.D.L. REv. 567 (1974); Doll, Farm Debt as Related to Value of Sales, 49 Fed. Res. Bull.
140 (1963); Leavitt, A Bank Examiner Looks at Agricultural Lending, 49 Fed. Res. Bull.
922 (1963).
25 Real estate, of course, continues to serve as collateral for farm loans, but its predomi-
nance as that type of collateral has diminished. See Brake, supra note 24, at 589, 591-92.
26 See generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, ch. I (1955).
27 For example, until 1972, the Uniform Commercial Code, outof fear that a farmer could
become a "peon" if he were able to encumber his crops for years to come, would not permit
a farmer to mortgage future crops. See Hawkland, supra note 22, at 421. See also § 9-
204(4)(a) (1962 version); § 9-312(2).
28 Factor's lien acts were adopted by a majority of states and grew primarily out of the
textile industry but were utilized in other industries as well. See generally Skilton, The
Factor's Lien on Merchandise-Part 1, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 356. Trust receipts, on the other
hand, were originally a common law device and were later broadened by the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act. See generally I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, ch.
4 (1965).
29 Professor Skilton argues that the factor's lien acts might apply depending on the
language of the particular act, but he cites no evidence that farm lenders resorted to them.
See Skilton, supra note 28, at 389.
30 See generally I L. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES
§§ 54a & c (6th ed. 1933).
31 See generally Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L. J. 517, 529 (1948).
32 See generally Skilton, supra note 28, at 363.
33 It was the general rule of chattel mortgage law that a sale by the mortgagor does not
defeat the interest of the mortgagee in the property. See Hathaway v. Brayman, 42 N.Y. 322
(1870); contra, Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 9; Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 9(2). There
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ever, frequently did enjoy that protection. Under the early factor's acts, 34
for example, those who purchased farm commodities from a factor
defeated the rights of a true owner if the owner had authorized the factor
to sell or had entrusted the factor with a document of title. 35 It mattered
not, however, whether the seller had limited the factor's authority. If the
factor could sell, the true owner's conditions or limitations did not
prevent the good faith purchaser from taking free of these conditions.
36
The Supreme Court held, furthermore, that the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act yielded a similar result if the true owner entrusted a
warehouse receipt to an agent.37 These rules applied against not only the
true owner but also against his creditors. 38 Thus, pre-Code rules favored
security of property if the farmer marketed his goods himself, but favored
commercial celerity if he marketed them by using documents of title or
through a factor with authority to sell.
The drafting of the Code provided an appropriate occasion to re-
examine these differences. Although these disparate rules seem to result
from the historic forces that fashioned them and not from any conscious
policy election, the Code accepted them almost intact.
CRITICISM OF THE RULE
Not surprisingly, commentators, who have traditionally championed
the open market, accept the farm products exception with reluctance.
While some of these commentators acknowledge the initial premise that
farm financing is sui generis, 39 they are unable to articulate persuasive
reasons for the separate classification, and they generally disapprove of
the farm products exception. ° Although various criticisms have been
were exceptions, however, for cases of implied authority to sell, including sales by "trad-
ers" in the ordinary course of business. 2 L. JONES, supra note 30, §§ 457a-458.
34 The early factor's acts related to sales by factors of goods that were entrusted to them
by the true owner. See 6 Geo. 4, ch. 94 (1825). These acts differed from the more recent
factor's lien acts which related to factors who acted as inventory lenders. See N.Y. PERS.
PROP. LAW § 45 (McKinney) (repealed 1964).
35 See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 43 (McKinney) (repealed 1964).
36 See Gazzola v. Kimball, 156 Tenn. 229, 299 S.W. 1039 (1927).
37 Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520 (1916).
38 Id.
39 "Buyers of farm products are presumed to be professionals, and as such they are likely
to know that security interests in what they buy are common." Coogan, Public Notice
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including
"Notice Filing, " 47 IowA L. REV. 289, 302 (1962). See Hawkland, supra note 22, at 418;
Hunt & Coates, The Impact of the Secured Transactions Article on Commercial Practices
with Respect to Agricultural Financing, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 165, 170-71 (1951).
40 Professor Skilton, in discussing the official comment to § 9-307(1), expresses dismay
that the comment offers little comfort "[t]o one who sees little or no justification in the
first place" for the farm products exclusion. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 597, 625. See also Coates, Financing the
Farmer, 20 PRAC. LAW. 45 (1974); Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-
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forwarded against the farm products exception, two persuasively argue
against this exception. The first concerns the unfairness and economic
impact of holding that sales are subject to the inventory lender's security
interest. The second stems from the fact that a party granted a purchase
money security interest in after-acquired inventory need not give notice to
the prior farm inventory lender.
Surprise and the "His Seller" Trap
The first criticism of the farm products exception usually centers on
the unfairness that attends the fact that purchasers of farm products from
farmers are often unaware that the vegetables they buy at the roadside
stand are encumbered. 41 Critics are especially concerned about the appli-
cation of the section to subsequent purchasers after the initial inventory
sale by the farmer. The buyer-in-ordinary-course doctrine, under the
language of section 9-307, applies only to security interests "created by
his seller";42 that is, the security interest is discharged only if it was one
created by the person selling to the buyer in ordinary course. Therefore,
the subsequent purchaser takes subject to the security interest created by
the farmer, since the farmer is not "his seller." For example, if a farmer
grants a security interest in his grain to a production credit association and
then sells the grain to an elevator which, in turn, sells it to a broker,
neither the elevator nor the broker take free of the association's security
interest. The elevator, while it may fit the definition of a buyer in
ordinary course, cannot avail itself of the buyer-in-ordinary-course rule of
section 9-307(1), because it buys from a person engaged in farming
operations. The broker also cannot avail himself of the section because,
even though he may rise to the status of a buyer in ordinary course, he
only takes free of security interests created by his seller: the elevator. The
farmer created the security interest in question, and the broker, therefore,
takes subject to it. Accordingly, commentators speculate in mock horror
that a Palm Beach at the haberdasher's, 43 a box of cereal at the grocer's, 44
and a sizzling ribeye on the platter45 may be subject to the lien of a
farmer's lender. 46
307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U. COLO. L. REv. 333 (1975); Hawkland, note
22 supra.
41 The simile is Professor Henson's. R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 86 (1973). See also Coogan, supra note 39, at 301.
42 Section 9-307(1) (emphasis supplied).
43 See § 9-315. If goods, such as cotton, become part of a product, such as cloth, a
perfected security interest in the cotton continues in the cloth. The rule applies to "cases
where flour, sugar and eggs are commingled into cake mix. ... Section 9-315, Comment
3.
44 Coates, supra note 40, at 49.
45 Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 677, 186 N.W.2d 99, 104
(1971) (Newton, J., dissenting).
46 "Security interests in farm products survive, regardless of perfection, well into the
consumer's digestive tract." Dugan, supra note 40, at 362. But cf. First Nat'l Bank v.
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The criticism implicit in these examples loses most of its bite,
however, in light of the practical obstacles confronting the lender who
chooses to pursue distant collateral. 47 Needless to say, a wheat crop
financer will derive little economic benefit from chasing his debtor's
wheat in grocery stores or kitchen cupboards. The criticism gains respect-
ability, on the other hand, in situations where a slaughterhouse, grain
elevator, cotton gin, or broker buys the farmer's products. In these
instances the farm financer enjoys targets far less elusive and diffuse than
products held by grocers and consumers. In fact, the cases indicate that
financers are not reluctant to sue such defendants as brokers and slaugh-
terhouses on conversion theories. 4
8
The basis of the objection, then, is sound. Because of the "his
seller" requisite of the buyer-in-ordinary-course rule, farm lenders can
follow the collateral to purchasers who do not buy from the farmer. On
the other hand, in the nonfarm situation, because the original buyer in
ordinary course from a nonfarmer takes free and clear of the security
interest, the buyer may pass the goods on to his buyers free of any such
encumbrance. 49 Gauging the fairness of these differences depends in part
on whether the purchaser losing the protection is a slaughterhouse or
grain elevator rather than a consumer motoring through the countryside
on a fine summer evening, and the justification for accepting or rejecting
this criticism may well turn upon the way one perceives the farm pur-
chaser. 5
0
Boston, - Colo. App. -, 564 P.2d 964 (1977) (security interest in crops does not extend to
cattle that ate them).
47 These comments apply only in the context of agricultural sales. For a discussion of the
"his seller" feature in other contexts, see Knapp, Protecting the Buyer of Previously
Encumbered Goods: Another Plea for Revision of UCC Section 9-307(1), 15 ARIz. L. REv.
861 (1973).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944 (N.D.
Ind. 1975); United States v. E.W. Savage & Son, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972),
aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss.
1972); Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1970); Farmers State Bank v.
Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625 (1973). Some of the
conversion cases, by explaining marketing practices, demonstrate the full implication and
adverse impact of imposing conversion liability on defendant brokers and slaughterhouses.
For this reason some courts are reluctant to invoke a conversion rule. See, e.g., United
States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
49 See § 9-307(1). That is not to say, however, that the "his seller" feature poses no
problems outside the realm of agricultural commodities. It does, as Professor Knapp
explains. See Knapp, note 47 supra.
50 Whether it should so turn is another matter. "Perhaps a small country bank holding a
small country mortgage makes a more appealing plaintiff than a national finance company
doing a multi-million dollar business in inventory financing-but in fact these days .the
mortgagee is apt to be one of the many agencies of the United States which dabble in the
farm credit business." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.10,
at 707 (1965). In one case it was not a buyer but a buyer's bank with a security interest in
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Regardless of the fairness or unfairness of this subordination of the
interests of subsequent purchasers of farm products, the farm products
exception is subject to criticism on the basis of economic consequences.
In theory many buyers of farm products are well aware of the exception
and either go to the expense of a filing search or buy at their peril. As a
result, such buyers must determine either the cost of the search or of the
risk. The buyer then has three alternatives for accommodating these
costs: he may increase the price to his customers, decrease the offering
price to the farm seller, or accept the costs himself. Whatever alternative
he selects, agricultural commerce ultimately bears the costs and the
corresponding consequences in both domestic and international markets.
The Purchase Money Priority Problem
Even without the "unfair surprise" problem, the farm products rule
confronts a second and more subtle criticism arising out of the inventory
priority rules. Article 9 provides that a purchase-money secured party's
rights to inventory will not take priority over a person having an earlier
perfected security interest in the same inventory unless the purchase-
money party gives notice. 51 Thus, for example, if a debtor grants a bank a
floating security interest in inventory, that is, a security interest in all of
its inventory whether then owned or thereafter acquired, and if the debtor
subsequently grants a security interest to a supplier whose credit permits
the debtor to acquire additional inventory, the supplier can defeat the
bank only if it gives notice to the bank of the purchase money transac-
tion.52 The notice requirement protects the revolving inventory financer
by virtue of the fact that it prevents the dilution of the collateral without
his knowledge. 53 At the same time, it grants priority to a creditor who
merits it: a creditor who provided the financial resources to purchase the
after-acquired property. In short, the rule provides flexibility for inven-
tory financing by facilitating a new source of credit to the debtor and
protecting the original lender from surprise.
At the same time, as Professor Hawkland points out, 54 because farm
products are not "inventory," 5 5 financing of farm "inventory" (that is,
farm products) does not qualify for such flexible treatment. Since farm
products are not "inventory," a purchase-money sale of such goods falls
within section 9-312(4), which contains no notice provision-and the
after-acquired property which sustained the loss. Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek
Meat Co., 266 Or. 643, 513 P.2d 1129 (1973).
51 Section 9-312(3).
52 See, e.g., Redisco, Inc. v. United Thrift Stores, Inc. (In re United Thrift Stores, Inc.),
363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966).
53 Section 9-312, Comment 3.
54 Hawkland, supra note 22, at 418.
55 See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
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revolving agricultural lender loses the benefit of the notice. 56 Thus, the
lender may unknowingly be put in the position of being unable to satisfy
his debt from the farmer and be forced to pursue the inventory collateral
in the hands of subsequent purchasers. As we have seen, this inventory
may be sufficiently dispersed to make this remedy impractical. This
danger may deter the extension of revolving credit to farmers despite the
fact that, as several authorities suggest, agricultural businesses need
revolving credit 57 as a result of growing capital requirements. Similarly,
because farm products are not inventory, proceeds from their sale elude
the revolving lien farm lender, although such proceeds continue as colla-
teral for the revolving inventory financer of other industries. 5 8 In short,
the farm products exceptions from the inventory definition and from the
open market rule, both of which ostensibly protect farmers and farm
lenders, create an obstacle to one type of credit farmers, need, even
though both of these exceptions are ostensibly designed to protect farmers
and farm lenders. 59
Traditional Rationale for the Farm Products Exception
Notwithstanding these criticisms of the exception, courts and
commentators advance two arguments in support of the exception. The
first of these, that agricultural enterprises will not be able to secure credit
without this "favorable" agricultural lending rule,60 rings hollow against
the arguments set out in the preceding portion of this article. It is difficult
to see how a rule which hinders agricultural business, as the farm
products exception does, can help the creditors of that business. Presum-
ably, agricultural lenders, whether government-funded or not, 61 are just
56 See United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Neb. 1971);
Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 50 Wis. 2d 270, 184 N.W.2d 122 (1971).
57 See, e.g., Bunn, note 22 supra; Clark, Some Problems in Agricultural Lending Under
the UCC, 39,U. COLO. L. REv. 352 (1967); Hunt & Coates, supra note 39, at 180.
58 This distinction is evident in the language of § 9-312(3) which limits the purchase
money inventory priority to "identifiable cash proceeds received on or before delivery of
the inventory" to the debtor's buyer. Section 9-312(4) extends the purchase money priority
to all proceeds. Thus, § 9-312(3) tends to protect revolving "inventory" lenders' claims to
proceeds. Because the intermediate revolving farm lender is not an "inventory" lender, he
loses that additional protection. See § 9-312, Comment 3.
59 This discussion does not necessarily apply in jurisdictions which have not adopted the
1972 amendments to article 9. See generally R. HENSON, supra note 41, § 6-5, at 137-38.
60 While no one appears enthusiastic about this rationale for the rule, those who support
the rule usually resort to it. See Note, AgriculturalFinancing underthe U.C.C., 12 ARIz. L.
REv. 391 (1970). Cf. 2 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 1285 (1954) (bank lawyer objecting to the general rule of § 9-307(1) on the theory
that it imperils the lender's security).
61 Although the article 9 review committee emphasizes the role of the federal govern-
ment in agricultural lending, the government is not the only source of such credit. Commer-
cial banks make more than 50% of the total non-real estate loans to farmers. Brake, supra
note 24, at 592. Sellers of farm equipment and supplies. to the extent that they sell on credit,
also comprise a significant, though difficult to measure, component of the overall credit
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as interested in promoting the sale of agricultural commodities and
healthy prices as their borrowers are. Similarly, it is difficult to under-
stand how intermediate term agricultural lending is enhanced by a rule
which deprives it of the notice and proceeds protection the Code affords
the rest of the commercial sector.
A second subtle and rarely articulated justification for the farm
products rule stems from the idea that most agricultural sales differ
fundamentally from most nonagricultural sales. This theory assumes the
farm sale paradigm to consist of a small yeoman farmer selling his annual
crop to a large, sophisticated grain company. Accordingly, the theory is
premised on the belief that the sophisticated farm products purchaser,
unlike the less sophisticated buyers of other goods, will be aware of the
exception to the free market rule and will therefore take steps to protect
himself.
Certainly not all farm transactions fit the model: the dairy industry
and some livestock operations are notable exceptions. 62 Nevertheless, it
is reasonable to assume that many, and perhaps most, do fit this model.
The farm paradigm survives in part from the nation's historic image of
subsistence farming and crafty brokers. 63 It may be inconsistent with
modern realities of agricultural commerce 64 to picture all agricultural
sales in such fashion, yet it may be consistent with many of those modem
realities, and legislatures may design rules based on reasonable presump-
tions of what the realities of the situations are. It is an acknowledged fact
that the drafters of the Code assumed the converse situation of strong
sellers and relatively weak buyers as generally the case, and therefore
fashioned some of the Code to serve that assumption, even though, that
assumption is also not always true.65 Regardless of the reasonableness of
picture. See generally ECON. RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AFS-3
Agricultural Finance Statistics (July 1976). [hereinafter cited as AFS-3].
62 See generally Comment, Proposed Anticorporate Farm Legislation, 1972 Wis. L. REV.
1189, 1194, 1197-98.
63 One court put the image in the following terms:
I pay no compliment to that enterprising and intelligent class of men, the dealers in
cotton, when I remark, that from personal observation I am persuaded, they are betterjudges of the quality and value of cotton, and will sooner detect its imperfections, and
its intermixture with foreign materials, than even the grower himself, when they have
equal opportunities. The grower has no other standard of quality than his own or his
neighbor's crop.
Carnochan v. Gould, 17 S.C.L. (I Bail.) 179, 182 (1829).
64 "While family farms still exist in this country, farms operating on a subsistence basis
rather than operating as businesses must now be a small part of the total occupation of
farming." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW
COMMITrEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Preliminary Draft No. 2, at
15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft No. 21.
65 "[The drafting assumes that the seller is the big fellow and the buyer the little fellow."
Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 321, 324.
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these assumptions, however, the Code's widely adopted local filing
option frustrates the purpose of the distinction.
If, in fact, purchasers from agricultural businesses are large and
sophisticated business enterprises, it is reasonable to assume that they are
or ought to be aware of the farm products rule. The local filing option
reduces to futility, however, any effort on their part to discover the
existence of a security interest.6 A grain transaction illustrates the
dilemma.
It is not enough for a Kansas City broker to know that the grain he
acquires comes from Texas, Nebraska, or Kansas. He must determine the
county where, the owne- of the grain resides or, if the owner does not
reside in the state from which the grain originates, the county where the
grain was grown. 67 Such an inquiry requires that the buyer discover the
identity of the producer-an investigation which is complicated by the
fact that the buyer may not be dealing with the producer but with the
producer's buyer or another intermediate party. Thus, a broker may be
dealing with an elevator which has acquired its grain from a number of
growers. A broker may be dealing with a cattle-feeding operation, which
fattens cattle and acts as selling agent for dozens of investors, 68 any of
which may have granted a security interest in his own cattle. Finally, the
"his seller" characteristic confounds the inquiry not only for the first
buyer but for each subsequent buyer down the chain of buyers until the
goods are sufficiently dispersed to render the secured party's attempts to
locate them inefficient. If the buyer decides not to search, he cannot be
sure that title is good.69
66 Professor Dugan goes a step further: "[I]t is fatuous to expect buyers in ordinary
course to check the Article 9 filings." Dugan, supra note 40, at 344 n.39.
67 This example assumes that the local filing rules of the second and third alternatives to
subsection (1) of § 9-401 or analogous nonconforming provisions are in force, as indeed they
are in all but five jurisdictions. See note 16 supra. Those alternative subsections provide
that the place to file for farm products is the local filing office in the county of the debtor's
residence or, if the debtor is not a resident of the state, then in the county where the goods
are kept. When the collateral is growing crops there must be a filing in the county where the
land is located.
68 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1970); In re
Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 193 (W.D. Wis. 1976). See also In
re Cadwell, Martin Meat Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 710 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Bank of Madison
v. Tri-County Livestock Auction Co., 123 Ga. App. 768, 182 S.E.2d 687, rev'd, 228 Ga. 325,
185 S.E.2d 393 (1971); Clark, note 57 supra.
69 He can rely, of course, on his cause of action for breach of warranty of title under § 2-
312. Any suggestion, however, that this cause of action provides buyers with sufficient
protection misunderstands the basic presupposition of the open market rule: a cause of
action by itself is insufficient. See generally Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954). Several states have anticipated the problem and
made provision for central filing of financing statements for livestock. See, e.g., California,
Maine, and Oregon versions of § 9-401(1)(c). CAL. COM. CODE § 9401(1)(c) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 9-401(1)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); OR. REV.
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In sum, the notion that agricultural commodity buyers are sufficient-
ly sophisticated to protect themselves by searching and therefore do not
need the protection of an open market rule rests on insecure footing.
Practically speaking, such buyers cannot protect themselves, and the
consequences are uncertainty and economic loss for the agricultural
commodity markets.
THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD AND THE EXCEPTION: A CRITIQUE
OF THE UNIFORMITY RATIONALE
Early drafts of the Code characterized its farm exception to the open
market rule as nothing more than the acceptance of a historic rule. 70 The
1950 Proposed Final Draft fostered market freedom in all but farm sales,
and achieved the exception in much the same fashion as the present Code
by excluding "farm products" from the definition of inventory71 and by
limiting market freedom to sales of inventory. 72 In addition, the 1950
Proposed Final Draft's definition of inventory recognized that the pro-
cessing of farm products alters the character of those products so that they
become the farmer's inventory. 73 In short, Code drafters provided early
that a farmer can hold and sell inventory, making him subject to both the
open market rule and the inventory rules, but only in the infrequent
situation where the farmer has processed his farm products. 74 Subsequent
drafts of the Code, while varying the language of the operative sections,
maintained and even strengthened this dichotomy between inventory and
farm products. 75
This twenty-year commitment to the farm products exception
STAT. § 79.4010(1) (Oregon Digest 1977). See also MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 52-319 (Smith
Cum. Supp. 1975). In Montana a notice of livestock lien must be listed in the office of state
stock inspectors stationed at the several "central livestock markets" for an auctioneer to be
liable in conversion.
70 See § 9-307, Comment 2 (1950 version). Professor Gilmore described it as an instance
of article 9 "bowing before the weight of case law authority." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 50,
at 714.
71 Section 9-109(5) (1950 version).
72 Section 9-307(1) (1950 version).
73 "Goods" are farm products, the 1950 version said, only if they are in their "unmanu-
factured state." Section 9-109(4) (1950 version).
74 The present official version lists "ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and
eggs" as being sufficiently "unmanufactured" to fit the farm products definition. Section 9-
109(3).
75 The 1951 Proposed Final Draft No. 2 removed all purchases of agricultural goods,
whether farm products or inventory, from the open market rule. See §§ 1-201(9), 9-307(1)
(1951 version). The official text of 1952, the first of the drafts adopted by the sponsoring
agencies, continued this broad exemption of sales by farmers. See §§ 1-201(9), 9-307(1) (1952
version). It was not until the 1957 official version that the Code retrenched from the broad
farm exception by limiting it to farm products alone as opposed to farm goods, thereby
reinstating processed farm products as inventory. See § 9-307(1) (1957 version). With minor
changes, the balance struck in the 1957 Code prevails today. See §§ 9-109(3), 9-307(1).
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confronted the review committee appointed by the permanent editorial
board to consider changes in article 9.76 That committee proposed to treat
farm sales as any other business sale. The board, however, rejected the
change.77
The review committee's recommendation assumed that the farm
products exception was rooted in pre-Code rules,78 questioned the advisa-
bility of retaining it, and noted: "Feelings run strong on this issue
... ,,79 It suggested that the federal government "insists on the preser-
vation of its security interest on farm products as against buyers or
auctioneers . ... 80
In short, the committee, even though it supported the change,
expressed reluctance based on two assumptions: first, the strength of
historic forces and local feeling fosters unwillingness among the states to
accept such a change; and second, the federal government would resist
such a change. Both of these assumptions entail the danger of lack of
uniformity, 81 and they may have prompted the board's ultimate decision
not to change the rule. The following discussion of the profferred justifi-
cations for the farm products rule includes an analysis of these assump-
tions. That analysis suggests that the assumption that the federal govern-
ment would resist the change is incorrect, and that lack of uniformity
endures even though the states may be hostile to the change.
Role of the Federal Government
In the early 1930's, the federal government's role in agricultural
financing broadened from real estate lending to comprehensive agricul-
tural credit.82 Today, crops, livestock, and equipment serve directly or
indirectly as collateral for government loans through a complex network
of government agencies 83 which provide credit for a significant percent-
76 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL RE-
PORT at vii-ix (1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
77 See Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 64, at 15-16; FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at
209. The committee suggested the change as an "optional" amendment. Id.
78 Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 64, at 15.
79 FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 209.
80 d.
81 The Code commands that its provisions be construed liberally and applied to promote
its underlying purposes, one of which is "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." Section 1-102(2)(c). The review committee affirmed the importance of uni-
formity in article 9. "[I]t would be a great mistake to introduce serious nonuniformity into
any fundamental aspect of operations under Article 9." Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note
64, at 1. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at vii.
82 See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 50, § 32.3.
83 The federal government's role in agricultural lending includes both direct loans through
the Farmers Home Administration and indirect loans through the farm credit system, which
includes federal land bank associations, farm cooperatives, and production credit associa-
tions. See generally Brake, note 24 supra.
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age of all agricultural financing.8 4 In the past, the government has not
hesitated to use the attractiveness of its credit as a lever to direct change in
state law to make its position more secure. 85
Commercial lawyers, including those instrumental in drafting the
Code, are ever conscious that the Code is peculiarly state law.8 6 Most
federal courts hold that federal, not state, law applies to suits in which the
federal government is itself a party.87 If the assumptions of the editorial
review committee are correct that the farm products exception benefits
farm lenders (to whom the federal government has made substantial
commitments), and that federal courts and Congress fashion federal law
to protect federal agencies, then a change in the Code's farm products
exception might prompt federal courts or Congress to reject the Code
rule. Accordingly, these two assumptions merit examination.
Economic Benefit of Farm Product Exception to Farm Lenders.-
The previously discussed economic objections to the farm products rule
support the argument that the rule does not benefit agricultural lenders.
The whole purpose of the open market concept is to foster sales. Except
for the unwary buyer, buyers of farm products from the farming enter-
prise must either inquire as to the state of the title or take it at their peril.
Both the inquiry and risk of clouded title clearly impede the free flow of
agricultural commodities and thereby may have a depressing effect on
farm prices and sales. This economic impact would not benefit agricul-
tural lenders.
The unwary buyer, of course, will fail to compute that peril into his
price. He is the most likely prey of the agricultural lender under the
present rule. An argument justifying the exception from such a state of
facts is hardly persuasive. No supporter of the exception has mustered the
temerity to make it expressly. One wonders, however, whether it is not
implicit in much of the pressure of the federal agency lobby.
In brief, it is difficult to bottom the farm exception rule on the plight
of the unwary buyer and more difficult to defend the rule's harmful
consequences for agriculture itself, which, one would assume, Congress
84 The most recent data indicate that the federal government's role in farm real estate
debt approximates 36% of the amount loaned and in non-real estate farm debt approximates
41% of the amount loaned. See AFS-3, supra note 61, Tables 2, 19.
85 In order to enjoy the full benefit of the farm credit program, many states modified their
crop mortgage statutes in the 1930'%. See Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 31, at 536.
86 Congress has adopted the Code for the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE § 28:1-101
(1967).
87 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States v.
Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971); Cassidy Comm'n Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th
Cir. 1967); United States v: Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Wegemat-
ic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964); Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d
745 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957).
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intended to benefit from the agricultural lending program. 88 Accordingly,
there is little to commend the position that the rule's justification lies in its
benefit to agricultural lenders or that Congress should so view it.
Judicial Alteration of Federal Law to Protect Federal Agencies.-
The second assumption which underlies the board's adherence to the farm
products exception is the assumption that federal courts fashion rules
which are most favorable to federal agencies. The foregoing analysis
questioned whether the exception would in fact be beneficial to federal
interests. However, even assuming that the exception benefits farm lend-
ers and the federal agencies committed to them, it is questionable that
this benefit would motivate federal courts to retain the farm exception
rule notwithstanding its elimination from the Code. A close look at the
rule of federal cases reveals that uniformity of result is the principal
reason for judicial adoption of federal commercial law which differs from
state commercial law; and, accordingly, that the uniformity of a Code
rejection of the farm products exception would prompt federal adherence
to that result regardless of any putative federal benefit of retaining the
rule.
The leading case dealing with judicial formulation of federal
commercial law different from applicable state law is Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States .89 In Clearfield Trust a check issued by the federal
government was cashed with a forged indorsement. The payee was not
given notice of the forged indorsement until more than fifteen months
later, at which time the federal government instituted suit to recover the
amounts paid. Rather than apply state negotiable instruments rules, which
require prompt notice, and therefore would have yielded a result adverse
to the government, the Supreme Court resorted to the "federal law
merchant.' ' The Court held that delay in notice was a defense only if
actual damage to the payee was shown and, in effect, fashioned a rule to
accommodate the bureaucratic vastness of the national government. 9 1
While the factual holding in Clearfield supports the board's fear that
the federal courts would favor the federal government, the language and
rationale of Clearfield are far more reassuring: "The application of state
law . . . would subject the rights and duties of the United States to
exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by
making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain." 92 A proper
88 See generally Brake, note 24 supra. See also 12 U.S.C. § 2001 (1976).
89 318 U.S. 363 (1942).
90 Id. at 367.
91 Id. at 369-70.
92 Id. at 367. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("Federal law is no juridical chameleon changing complexion to
match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents
of service of process and of the application of the venue statutes.").
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reading of Clearfield, then, reveals two concerns: first, that the govern-
ment cannot be subject to rules fashioned for private litigants and there-
fore unrealistic in their application to the government; and second, that
the government should not be subject to the vagaries and uncertainties
that obtain in the absence of uniformity.
Lower federal court decisions have carefully observed Clearfield's
uniformity rationale and therefore should dispel the concern that federal
courts will accede to a federal insistence on the farm products exception.
These decisions have held that the federal court prerogative of choosing
federal common law over state law arises in those situations where a
"genuine federal interest would be subjected to uncertainty by applica-
tion of disparate state rules." 93 That federal interest prevails especially in
instances involving the federal fisc. 94 This is not to say, however, that
federal courts must fashion a rule to favor the government in all instances.
"Rather, the thrust of this consideration is that federal rights should not
be at the mercy of the power of any particular state court or legislature to
change the applicable law." 95 While a majority of the circuits favor
application of the federal rule in farm sale cases, 96 that majority empha-
sizes the uniformity rationale of the Clearfield line of authority, 97 and
those which eschew the federal rule do so on the grounds that the need for
uniformity is not compelling. 98 In accord with the uniformity rationale,
federal courts reflect a ready willingness, furthermore, to incorporate the
93 United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 909 (1964). Significantly, the Sommerville court rejected Pennsylvania's Code, which it
saw as peculiarly state law, as it largely was in 1963. See also New York, N.H.&H. R. Co.
v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1950): "[S]uch agencies, being
national in their scope and aim, shall not be forced to shape their transactions to conform to
the varying laws of the places where they occur, or are to be carried out."
94 United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 810 n.18 (5th Cir. 1971); Cassidy Comm'n Co. v.
United States, 387 F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d
712, 716 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964).
95 United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971). Significantly, the Hext court,
whose opinion reflects strong support for a uniform federal rule, held against the Farmers
Home Administration.
96 Compare United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971); Duvall-Wheeler Live-
stock Barn v. United States, 415 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1969); Cassidy Comm'n Co. v. United
States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964);
United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1972), with United States v. Union
Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577
(8th Cir. 1956).
97 United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 715 n.8 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 909 (1964) ("The necessity of uniformity must decide whether state law should be
rejected as the source for the applicable federal rule."). See United States v. Union
Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577
(8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944 (N.D.
Ind. 1975).
98 See United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 1956).
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provisions of uniform state laws into the federal common law rules. For
example, provisions of the Uniform Sales Act99 and of the Negotiable
Instruments Law 10o found their way into federal common law as have the
provisions of article 2.101 Similarly, the federal bench recognizes that the
Code is truly "national law" 10 2 and accepts it enthusiastically as an
indication of what general law should be. 10 3 One federal opinion refers to
article 9 as the "principal fount of general commercial law governing
secured transactions.' 104
Not surprisingly, the Code's role as a source of federal law stems not
only from its reputation as a work of scholarship,0 5 but above all from
the uniformity it has achieved.
When the states have gone so far in achieving the desirable goal of a
uniform law governing commercial transactions, it would be a dis-
tinct disservice to insist on a different one for the segment of
commerce, important but still small in relation to the total, consisting
of transactions with the United States. 106
Accordingly, federal courts carefully avoid peculiarly local variations of
the Code and refer instead to the official version. 107 The Second Circuit,
which wholeheartedly endorses the Code as a source of federal common
law, 10 8 earlier rejected the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act as a source
upon one question, because state courts divided sharply on the meaning
of that statute. 109 It is, therefore, in its role as a restatement that the Code
serves as the source of the federal law. 110
99 Whitin Mach. Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504, 509 (1st Cir. 1949).
100 New York, N.H.&H. R. Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244-45 (2d
Cir. 1950).
101 Lea Tai Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1405 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
102 United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944, 946 n.3 (8th Cir. 1973); Fruehauf
Corp. v. Yale Express Sys., Inc. (In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.), 370 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir.
1966).
103 See Duvall-Wheeler Livestock Barn v. United States, 415 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1969);
Cassidy Comm'n Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967); Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express Sys., Inc. (In re Yale
Express Sys., Inc.), 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360
F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966). Cf., Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974) (per curiam) (the Court
concluded that the applicable federal law (Packers and Stockyard Act) did not override the
U.C.C. (TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE)).
104 United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1971).
105 Traynor, Statutes Revolving In Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 424
(1968).
106 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
107 See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944, 946 n.3 (8th Cir. 1973).
108 See Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express Sys., Inc. (In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.), 370
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
109 Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960).
110 Traynor, supra note 105, at 422; Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consol. Fisheries Co.,
190 F.2d 817, 822 n.9 (3d Cir. 1951).
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Admittedly, nothing in these decisions commands the application of
the Code to federal questions. Some courts defer to it in the absence of
federal authority,"1 and one respected jurist recently urged Congress to
adopt the Code in order to avoid the "disturbing prospect" of disparity
between federal commerce law and the Code. 112 Nevertheless, an analy-
sis of the federal cases does not support the eventuality, implicit in the
review committee's concern, that the federal courts will insist upon the
farm products exception. The federal agencies which are lobbying for the
rule do not make federal common law, and federal courts do not fashion
that common law in order to favor those federal agencies. Instead, federal
courts fashion law to achieve certainty and uniformity and to effectuate
the purpose of federal programs.113 The excision of the farm products
exception from section 9-307(1) would not endanger those objectives,
making it likely that the federal courts will follow such an amendment
and not retain the old exception.
Actual Disuniformity in Farm Products Cases
The permanent editorial board does not appear to have been any
more concerned with rationalizing the farm products exception than were
the original drafters of the free market rule when they engrafted the farm
products exception onto it. Rather, the concern of both the original
drafters and the board in this area was with uniformity. The answer to this
concern for uniformity is a historical fact which the board apparently
overlooked: state courts and legislatures have already deviated from the
exception, so that there is in fact no uniformity. In addition, courts have
often done violence to useful principles of commercial law, thereby
giving rise to harmful precedent and jeopardizing other achievements of
the Code in the area of commercial lending. The remainder of this article
will discuss the theories under which courts and legislatures have sought
to avoid the effect of the farm products exception.
Waiver.-The 1950 Proposed Final Draft of the Code stipulated in
section 9-306 that by taking a security interest in proceeds, an inventory
lender gave his debtor authority to sell and waived the lender's security
interest when the sale was effected." 4 The rationale for this proposed
"rule of construction" 115 presumed that the security interest in proceeds
reflects a financing arrangement wherein the lender expects the debtor to
111 United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
112 Bank of America v. United States, 552 F.2d 302, 303 n.I (9th Cir. 1977) (opinion of
Clark, J.).
113 Unted States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967) ("Where a decision is likely
to have a substantial effect on the implementation of a federal program, then a federal court
should declare a rule consistent with the program's demands.").
114 Section 9-306(2) (1950 version).
115 Id., Comment 2(b).
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sell the goods and expects the buyer, having given value, to take free and
clear. Bank spokesmen criticized what they saw as unrelieved market
freedom in this and other purchaser provisions of the 1950 and subse-
quent drafts. 116 Professor Gilmore, one of the chief draftsmen of article 9,
defended the notion that the secured party should be satisfied with
proceeds. 117 The bankers prevailed, however, when the 1957 Official
Draft retreated somewhat by excising any reference in the text of the
statute to the notion that taking a security interest in proceeds amounts to
a waiver and constitutes authorization for sale. The notion survived,
however, in the comments, 118 and Professor Gilmore maintained his
original position.119 It was not until the 1972 revisions that the drafters
entirely eliminated from even the comments the idea that the taking of
proceeds is an indication of waiver of the security interest on sale.120
Nonetheless, section 9-306 stands as strong support for the waiver
argument by providing that an authorization to sell the secured collateral
destroys the security interest. Such an authorization may be found in the
security agreement itself or may arise "otherwise." The term "other-
wise" invites courts to construe actions of the creditor as waivers
amounting to sale authorization, and the rule of section 1-103, which
directs that the law of equity and the principle of estoppel "shall supple-
ment" the provisions of the Code, underscores that invitation. Courts
accept the concept of waiver as intrinsic to that section.121
As this paper noted earlier, in most industries inventory lenders
traditionally recognized the need for intermediate term, working capital
loans with inventory as collateral, as opposed to discrete inventory loans.
They have authorized the sale of inventory without the bother of prior
approval. By virtue of such authority, those sales become free of the
lender's lien under section 9-306(2). However, in the agriculture industry
farm lenders traditionally have refused to grant such authorization in the
security agreement. 122 As this article also suggests, historic features of
116 2 N.Y.LAw REVISION COMM'N, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1123,
1321-22 (1954).
117 !d. at 1184.
118 Section 9-306, Comment 3 (1962 version).
119 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 50, § 26.11.
120 In fact, the 1972 drafters were not satisfied with merely deleting the language from the
comment. They specifically rejected the notion that the taking of proceeds is any implica-
tion of waiver. "The right to proceeds, either under the rules of this section or under
specific mention thereof in a security agreement or financing statement does not in itself
constitute an authorization of sale." Section 9-306, Comment 3. This change may reflect the
fact that the 1972 Code also stipulates, contrary to earlier drafts, that unless the security
agreement otherwise provides, the secured party has a security interest in proceeds. Section
9-203(3).
121 Multiplastics, Inc. v. Arch Indus., Inc., 166 Conn. 280, 348 A.2d 618 (1974). See I
ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103:51, at 36 (2d ed. 1970).
122 Even though farm lenders have not authorized sale in the security agreement itself,
these lenders in practice have not insisted on notice by the farm debtor prior to an inventory
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agricultural lending, rather than logic, explain that refusal. In any event,
coupled with the farm products exception of section 9-307(1) (itself a
product of those same historic features), that refusal confronts courts with
a formidable obstacle to any open market result. A few courts, however,
have proved equal to the task.
The leading case reaching an open market result is Clovis National
Bank v. Thomas. 12 3 There the lender conducted itself in the fashion often
repeated throughout many of these cases and throughout much of agricul-
tural finance. The bank forbade the sale of collateral without its prior
written consent. At the same time, true to the reality of intermediate term
financing, the bank permitted the borrowing rancher to sell his cattle
without that consent. Instead, the bank relied on his honesty to account
for the proceeds either by paying the bank or by acquiring new cattle
inventory. This "course of conduct," the court ruled, amounted to a
waiver of the condition that sale must be consented to in writing. The
waiver of the condition left the sale authorized, and, pursuant to the rule
of section 9-306(2), such an authorized sale operated to place the collat-
eral in the hands of the purchaser free of the bank's lien. 124
Some critics promptly attacked the Clovis reasoning." They noted
the Code's command that express terms control over course of dealing
when the two cannot be construed together reasonably. 126 Since the
course of dealing in Clovis suggests no requirement for written authority
sale. In Colorado Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope Inv., Inc., 36 Colo. App. 149,539 P.2d
501 (1975), the security agreement forbade sales without the written consent of the bank.
The bank's loan officer testified that he never required his borrowers to obtain that consent.
He said that he relied on their honesty alone. See generally Hawkland, supra note 22, at 419;
Hunt & Coates, supra note 39, at 170-71. Other cases indicate that with marked consistency
farm lenders, including government agencies, do not insist on such notice as evidenced
through their course of dealing or usage of trade. See, e.g., United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1971); Cassidy Comm'n Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964);
United States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.D. 1972); United States
v. E.W. Savage & Sons, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Pirnie, 339 F. Supp. 702 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 472 F.2d
712 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Cadwell, Martin Meat Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 710 (E.D. Cal.
1970); Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974); Lisbon
Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973); Farmers State Bank v. Edison
Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625 (1973); Garden City Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971); Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77
N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967); Blubaugh v. Ponca City Prod. Credit Ass'n, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 786 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971); Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 50 Wis. 2d 270, 184
N.W.2d 122 (1971). See generally §§ 1-205(l) & (2). But see Fort Collins Prod. Credit Ass'n
v. Carroll Dairy, 553 P.2d 95, 97 (Colo. App. 1976).
123 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967).
124 The tension underlying the Clovis situation is not new to argricultural commerce. See,
e.g., Patridge v. Minnesota & D. Elev. Co., 75 Minn. 496, 78 N.W. 85 (1899).
125 See, e.g., 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 136 (1967); 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 183 (1968).
126 Section 1-205(4).
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and since the express terms do require it, reasonable construction of the
two does not obtain, and the Code's preference for express terms applies.
Professor Dugan 127 contends that in situations similar to Clovis the
course of dealing section is inapposite and that the course of performance
section controls. 128 Course of dealing comprises a "sequence of previous
conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to
be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding .... " 129
The term "previous" means "previous to the agreement," according to
the comments. 130 Course of performance involves conduct after the
agreement. 3 ' Although in Clovis it appears that the conduct was pre-
agreement, 3 2 certainly many, if not most, cases will involve post-agree-
ment conduct.
In any event, the same problem is posed for the Clovis defenders by
the course of performance section-it designates express terms control-
ling when those terms and course of performance cannot reasonably be
construed together.133 Professor Dugan argues, 13 4 however, that subsec-
tion 3 of the course of performance section renders course of performance
''relevant to show a waiver or modification" of any term inconsistent
with the course of performance. 35 If this argument is correct, the waiver
issue may turn in part on the question whether the conduct occurred
before or after the agreement. This position suffers, however, from the
fact that the course of performance provision is located in the sales article
and by its terms applies only to a "contract for sale." These factors
suggest that application of the course of performance provision to a
security agreement is inappropriate. 1
36
There remains, however, a second criticism of the Clovis court's
reliance on course of dealing. That criticism stems from the fact that the
party benefiting from the course of dealing in Clovis was not a party to it,
and, so far as the opinion discloses, did not even know about it. The Code
127 Dugan, supra note 40, at 340-41.
128 Section 2-208.
129 Section 1-205(l).
130 Section 1-205, Comment 2.
131 Section 1-205, Comment 2; § 2-208(1).
132 77 N.M. at 557-58, 425 P.2d at 727-28. There had been more than one security
agreement. The court found that the bank knew of sales without prior written consent under
earlier security agreements but had no actual knowledge of sales during the term of the
security agreement under which the bank was claiming.
133 Section 2-208(2). See § 1-205(4).
134 Dugan, supra note 40, at 340-41.
135 "[Tlhe preference is in favor of 'waiver' whenever such construction ... is needed
to preserve the flexible character of commercial contracts and to prevent surprise or other
hardship." Section 2-208, comment 3.
136 Professor Dugan, however, rejects the notion that the course of performance section
applies only to sales contracts. He contends that §§ 9-105(4) and 1-201(3) support extension
of the course of performance rule to security agreements. Dugan, supra note 40, at 340.
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expressly defines course of dealing as dealing "between the parties to a
particular transaction."' 3 7 The reason for this limitation is to respond to
the reasonable expectations and reliance of the parties and not of some
stranger. 13 8 The course of performance section may be given the same
construction. 139 The comments to that section note that the reason for the
rule is to "prevent surprise or other hardship." 140 Further support for this
construction is found in the fact that the section makes it clear that a
course of performance arises out of conduct by one party only when the
other party has had an opportunity to object to that conduct.141
The Clovis decision, by allowing a third party to take advantage of
the course of dealing between other parties, does not use the course of
dealing provision in this restricted manner. This broader construction,
however, is more correct. It does not matter that the effect of this
reasoning is to benefit a stranger to the course of dealing, because section
9-306(2) itself operates to carry the effect beyond the immediate parties to
that conduct. If the secured party had authorized the sale expressly, a
cattle auctioneer ignorant of that authorization would, nonetheless, es-
cape that liability because section 9-306(2) directs that an authorization to
sell renders the sale free of the security interest. By the same token, if the
course of dealing between the secured party and the debtor results in an
authorization to sell, it does not matter that the auctioneer is a stranger to
it. The reason behind the course of dealing section does not justify its
extension to strangers, but the reason behind section 9-306(2) does.
In addition, some cases criticize the Clovis court's use of the waiver
doctrine on the grounds that the bank did not intend to waive its security
interest. Traditionally, the argument goes, the doctrine of waiver includes
a requirement of knowledge.142 It is only the knowing waiver which the
law considers. Courts have rejected waiver arguments based on inadvert-
ent conduct or conduct which the actor does not reasonably know will
cost him a contract right. 143 In Clovis, however, the bank must be
charged with the knowledge that since it had not insisted upon prior
written approval on previous occasions, the court might conclude that
such conduct amounted to a waiver of the prior written approval require-
ment. It is also fair to infer that waiver of the requirement for prior written
consent amounts to an authorization to sell.
137 Section 1-205(!).
138 See Weidinger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 501 F.2d 459, 463
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
139 The term "other" in § 2-208(1) must be taken to mean the other party.
140 Section 2-208, Comment 3.
141 Section 2-208(l).
142 See Multiplastics, Inc. v. Arch Indus., Inc., 166 Conn. 280, 286, 348 A.2d 618, 621
(1974) ("Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.").
143 See, e.g., Kane v. American Nat'l Bank, 21111. App. 3d 1046, 316 N.E.2d 177 (1974).
72:706 (1977)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Courts which eschew Clovis nonetheless refuse to accept this rea-
sonable imputation of knowledge of waiver. They reason that while the
lender knew it was waiving the prior consent requirement, and may
reasonably be charged with knowledge it was waiving the prohibition
against sale, it did not know it was waiving its security interest in the
goods. 144
Those cases, however, require too much, because section 9-306(2)
renders it unnecessary to show a waiver of the security interest. It is only
necessary to show a waiver of the prohibition of sale. Section 9-306(2)
does the rest. It provides that an authorization to sell operates as a rule of
law to render the sale free of the security interest. There is nothing in
section 9-306(2) which suggests that the rule applies only if the secured
party intends to waive its security interest. The waiver by the Clovis Bank
of the prohibition against sale clearly falls within the "or otherwise"
language of the section, thereby terminating the security interest upon the
event of the sale. The better reasoned cases so hold.145
Some anti-Clovis courts advance the argument that lenders who
waive the prior consent requirement do so on condition that the debtor
will remit the proceeds to the lender. 146 That argument ignores the
language of section 9-306(2), which charges a sale authorization with the
legislative implication that the sale will be free of the security interest.
Courts which infer such a condition are allowing the private agreement to
frustrate not only the reason but also the letter of section 9-306(2). That
provision, an open market rule, is designed to protect purchasers. 147
Permitting the lender and seller to modify it by a condition is as unjus-
tified as permitting an entruster and bailee to modify the rule of section 2-
403(2) by private agreement.
144 Rather, these courts conclude that the secured party's knowledge was limited to the
fact that it was waiving only the prior written consent requirement. See, e.g., United States
v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964); Vermilion
County Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, I11 IIll. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (1969); Farmers
State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625 (1973);
Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).
145 E.g., Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Ceres Land Co., 32 Colo. App. 290, 512 P.2d 1174(1973);
Draper v. Minneapolis-Moline, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 2d 324, 241 N.E.2d 342 (1968); Tanbro
Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260
(1976); Credit Plan, Inc. v. Hall, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 514 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1972); United States
v. Pirnie, 339 F. Supp. 702 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 472 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973);
Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 266 Or. 643, 513 P.2d 1129 (1973). Cf.
South Omaha Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Tyson's, Inc., 189 Neb. 702, 204 N.W.2d 806 (1973)
(express condition, known to buyer, prevents operation of § 9-307(1)).
147 Section 9-306(2) is both a security of property provision to the extent that it allows the
security interest to follow the collateral into the hands of the purchaser and an open market
provision to the extent that it excepts from that rule collateral sold pursuant to a sale that is
authorized by the security agreement or otherwise. It is in the second sense that the text of
this article refers to § 9-306(2) as an open market provision.
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In short, there is a colorable argument for invoking waiver in the
frequently occurring Clovis situations. Although Clovis misconstrues the
course of dealing provision, an argument for waiver can be made from the
course of performance after the agreement-at least such an argument can
be made if courts are willing to apply the course of performance provision
to secured transactions under article 9. In any event, Clovis has spawned
a vigorous line of authority. 148 It should be noted, however, that these
cases represent the minority rule; a majority of courts have rejected the
waiver theory either because Clovis misinterprets course of dealing, or,
more spuriously, because courts hold the waiver to be conditioned on the
prepayment of sale proceeds to the secured party. 149
Estoppel.-In addition to the Clovis waiver argument, one district
court has adopted an estoppel theory which Clovis specifically rejected.
In United States v. Gleaners & Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co. ,150 the
defendant grain elevator purchased crops from a farmer that had obtained
financing from the United States Department of Agriculture. When the
defendant discovered the financing statement filed by the United States,
which apparently contained a general description of the collateral, it
asked the chief official of the local Farmers Home Administration (FHA)
whether the security interest covered the farmer's crops. The official
replied that the security interest covered only livestock and farm ma-
chinery, and, as a result, the defendant purchased the crops. The district
court held that the government was estopped to bring an action for
conversion on the basis of its actual lien on the crops because the grain
148 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.D. 1972); In re Cadwell,
Martin Meat Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 710 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974); Hedrick Savings Bank v. Meyers, 229
N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1975); Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973);
Central Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Baker, 11 Wash. App. 17, 521 P.2d 226 (1974).
149 See United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
909 (1964); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944 (N.D. Ind.
1975); United States v. E.W. Savage & Sons, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd,
475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1972);
United States v. Pirnie, 339 F. Supp. 702 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'dpercuriam, 472 F.2d 712 (8th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Ga. 1970); United
States v. Greenwich Mill & Elevator Co., 291 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Colorado
Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope Inv., Inc., 36 Colo. App. 149, 539 P.2d 501 (1975);
Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, I 11111. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (1969);
Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625
(1973); Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971);
First Nat'l Bank v. Calvin Pickle Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1245 (Okla. Ct. App.), rev'don
other grounds, 516 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1973); Blubaugh v. Ponca City Prod. Credit Ass'n, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 786 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).
150 314 F. Supp. 1148 (N.D. Ind. 1970). Cf. Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J.
Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33 (1970) (nonfarm case).
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elevator company was reasonably entitled to rely on the representations
made by the highest local official of the FHA.151
Estoppel facts, of course, are less likely to arise than are waiver
facts, and they probably yield results which are fair and which do not
interfere seriously with the availability of farm credit. One difficulty,
however, which confronts the estoppel argument is that some courts,
unlike the court in Gleaners, refuse to apply estoppel against the govern-
ment. 152 Thus, any significant expansion of the estoppel doctrine would
yield a lack of uniformity in the frequent cases where the federal govern-
ment is the plaintiff. Most courts, however, have rejected estoppel argu-
ments on one theory or another. 153
Limitations on Parties Subject to Conversion Liability.-In United
States v. Kramel,154 the Eighth Circuit applied pre-Code Missouri deci-
sions which held that livestock commission merchants were not liable in
conversion for dealing in cattle contrary to the lienholder's rights. 155 The
Missouri cases156 had construed the Federal Packers and Stockyards Act
as imposing public utility status on the stockyard along with a duty to
provide stockyard services without discrimination. That duty, the Mis-
souri courts felt, relieved the stockyard from conversion liability.
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision to overrule the Missouri
precedent on which Kramel relies renders Kramel suspect. 157 Yet, some
states 158 through legislation of their own have effectively neutralized
conversion claims against certain classes of defendants and thereby sub-
151 314 F. Supp. at 1151.
152 See, e.g., United States v. E.W. Savage & Sons, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972),
aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973). Cf. United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp. 539 (N.D.
Miss. 1972) (a waiver case).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944 (N.D.
Ind. 1975); United States v. E.W. Savage & Sons, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972),
aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n,
190 Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625 (1973); Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d
726 (1967); Blubaugh v. Ponca City Prod. Credit Ass'n, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 786 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1971); Layng v. Stout, 155 Wis. 553, 145 N.W. 227 (1914).
154 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956).
155 Accord, United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'don other grounds, 324
F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964); States Securities Co. v. Norfolk
Livestock Sales Co., 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W.2d 614 (1971).
156 Cresswell v. Leftridge, 194 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. App. 1946); Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo.
App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942), overruled, Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908
(Mo. 1970).
157 Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1970).
158 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-307(3) to (4) (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 52-
319 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-109.01 (1968). See also note 169 infra; State Securities
Co. v. Norfolk Livestock Sales Co., 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W.2d 614 (1971).
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stantially limited the effect of the farm products exception. 15 9 That
exception loses its strength as the creditor loses his target defendants. 160
Accordingly, these statutes, to some degree at least, overcome the effect
of the farm products rule, and add to the confusion and lack of uniformity
the permanent editorial board feared.
A recent Wisconsin case, moreover, culls from section 9-311 sup-
port for a holding of no conversion. In Production Credit Association of
Chippewa Falls v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Association,161 the
PCA's security agreement was silent on the issue of sales of collateral by
the farmer. When the farmer sold through an auctioneer, the PCA sued
the auctioneer in conversion. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned
that since section 9-311 gives the debtor the right to sell even though such
sale may breach the security agreement, that right of the debtor saves the
auctioneer from any conversion claim.
The Wisconsin court stretches section 9-311 out of shape. The
announced purpose of the provision is to make clear that the debtor
retains an interest in the goods (be it "title" or "equity of redemption")
and that he can alienate that interest voluntarily or by judicial process. 162
To expand the section beyond that limited purpose to support a change in
the accepted law of conversion violates the Code's precepts of construc-
tion' 63 and contradicts evidence elsewhere indicating that the Code leaves
the rules of conversion undisturbed. 164 If the Wisconsin court chooses to
alter conversion doctrine, it should not look to the Code for support. The
Chippewa Falls case demonstrates again the strong resistance of some
159 These conscious state decisions to depart from the course charted by the Code find a
parallel in the Texas experience concerning sales of livestock. Stowers v. Mahon (In re
Samuels & Co.), 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd per curiam, 416 U.S. 100 (1974), had
originally held, contrary to the clear import of the Code, that an unperfected seller of cattle
could defeat the security interest of the stockyard's bank which had acquired a security
interest in the cattle under an after-acquired property clause. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed and remanded. The same Fifth Circuit panel on remand reasserted its original
holding on somewhat different reasoning. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 510
F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975). But the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed, adopting the
dissenting opinion of Judge Godbold. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1976). In a vigorous dissent by Judge Ainsworth, joined by four others, the
majority of the original panel, however, persisted in its original position. The Texas legisla-
ture, moreover, had the last word when it created a cattleman's lien superior to any other
Code security interest. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6910(b), §§ 4-7 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978). Congress quickly followed suit by amending the Packers & Stockyards Act to
achieve the same result. Packers & Stockyards Act, Pub. L. No. 94-410, 90 Stat. 1249
(amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-203 (1976)).
160 Of course, the lienholder can trace the goods and replevy them, but that tracing can
become problematical early in the process. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
161 - Wis. 2d -, 261 N.W.2d 127 (1978).
162 Section 9-311, Comment 1.
163 See § 1-102, Comment 1.
164 See § 9-306, Comment 3.
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courts to accept the consequences of the farm products exception-a
resistance which, as here, may yield holdings that produce variation, not
uniformity, in Code law.
Negotiable Documents of Title.-There remains a subtle challenge
to the farm products exception with far reaching implications. An actual
case illustrates it best. In United States v. Hext t65 the farmer delivered his
cotton for marketing to a gin, which processed the cotton and warehoused
it against negotiable warehouse receipts. The secured party, the govern-
ment, knew of the delivery to the cotton gin and knew that the gin
company was closely related to the warehouse company. When the
warehouse sold the cotton, the government sued it on a conversion
theory. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment for the
government, reasoning, in waiver or estoppel fashion, that the secured
party's conduct prevented it from disputing the authority of the defendant
warehouse.
More significantly, as an alternate theory for its holding, the court
relied on section 7-503. That provision restricts the negotiability of
documents of title by providing that the documents confer no right in
goods against a person (such as the government in the Hext case) who had
obtained a security interest in the goods prior to the issuance of the
document by the bailee. In short, the section operates in the spirit of
security of property principles. The provision, however, does not escape
open market precepts altogether, for it stipulates that its security of
property rule shall not apply if the secured party "acquiesced" in the
procurement by the bailor of the document of title, or if the secured party
"delivered or entrusted" the goods to the bailee with actual or apparent
authority to "ship, store or sell" or otherwise deal with the products in a
fashion that article 2 and article 9 would consider as calling for open
market principles. 166 Applying this provision, the court held that the
government had entrusted the cotton to the farmer with the apparent
authority to store the cotton in the warehouse. 167 The court further held
that the government had acquiesced in the procurement of warehouse
receipts since it knew that it was the custom of the trade to market cotton
in that manner and took no steps to prevent it. 161
The Hext opinion is significant for three reasons. First, the secured
party in Hext was the Farmers Home Administration. Thus if Hext were
to arise today in a state limiting the liability of commodity merchants, a
court applying federal law would follow rules far different from those
commanded by the state statute. 169 Hext, then, demonstrates how the
165 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
166 Section 7-503(l)(a)-(b).
167 United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 814-15 n.34 (5th Cir. 1971).
168 d.
169 As the Hext opinion noted, the Texas legislature modified the rule of conversion
liability of cotton brokers in apparent response to the district court's decision against the
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federal law-state law dichotomy can contribute to a lack of uniformity.
Second, because the defendant was a warehouseman, rather than an
auctioneer, the court could have relied on section 7-404. That section
provides that a warehouseman is not liable in conversion if he observes
reasonable commercial standards and in good faith delivers the goods to
the holder of negotiable receipts.170 That specific provision of article 7,
of course, contrasts sharply with the rule of liability which generally faces
auctioneers and brokers under the Code and under the common law of
conversion in most states. Section 7-404 parallels the state statutes,
mentioned earlier, that limit conversion liability; it has the same effect of
contributing to the diversity of result in these cases.
The Hext decision also furthers disuniformity in a much more
fundamental and significant way. The "acquiesced" and "entrusted"
language of section 7-503, taken with the reference in it to section 2-403,
signals an invitation to use waiver and estoppel principles to achieve open
market results. Professor Gilmore concludes that any time a lender leaves
with the debtor goods which are inventory in nature, such as farm
commodities, the lender has entrusted these goods for the purposes of
section 7-503. 171 Similarly, if a lender leaves farm goods with a farmer in
an area or industry where farmers traditionally warehouse products, and
the lender takes no steps to prevent this practice, then for purposes of
section 7-503(l)(b) the lender will have acquiesced in the procurement of
documents of title. Whether a secured party otherwise "delivered" or
"entrusted" with apparent authority, or whether the secured party "ac-
quiesced" in the procurement of the warehouse receipt, are factual issues
similar to issues such as "negligence" or "reasonableness." Such
concepts lend themselves to characterization and are appropriately re-
solved by trial; they do not fix parameters or lead to uniformity. To the
contrary, their vagueness fosters diversity. This disuniformity feature is
likely to be substantial. A significant number of agricultural businesses
effect the sale of farm products through negotiable warehouse receipts,
and, to the extent that they do, courts may be able to reach results
different from those that would obtain under the farm products exception.
CONCLUSION
Out of a desire for uniformity and a need to come to terms with
strong local feelings, the Code perpetuates a historic rule excluding many
cotton broker. 444 F.2d at 809. See Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5571 (West Cum. Supp.
1978).
170 In fact, the Hext court did refer to § 7-404 with respect to the warehouse defendant.
444 F.2d at 814-15 n.34. Cf. §§ 8-318, 3-419(3) (which attempt to create similar conversion
immunity for agents dealing in investment securities and depository banks, respectively).
171 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 50, § 25.4, at 666. The pre-Code cases, using waiver and
estoppel theories, support Professor Gilmore. See, e.g., Commodity Credit Corp. v. Usrey,
199 Ark. 406, 133 S.W.2d 887 (1939).
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farm sales from open market principles. The exclusion stems first from
the origins of agricultural finance, which developed under conditions
different from that of other commercial finance; second, from archaic
notions of agricultural commerce; and third, from the perception that
agricultural sales are sufficiently different from other sales to merit
different treatment.
The unique history of agricultural finance goes far in explaining the
farm products exception. Agricultural lenders, enjoying protection from
the open n arket, are reluctant to relinquish what they see as their
preferred status. The nation's romance with the sturdy, yeoman farmer
dies slowly, and even though thoughtful economists agree that agricultur-
al credit needs parallel those of the rest of the economy, the myth persists,
thereby impeding entry of agricultural commerce into the open market.
The argument that agricultural sales may be unique in that most farm
sellers are small and most farm buyers big, falls before the impossible
search burdens imposed by the local filing rule and the "his seller"
feature of section 9-307(1).
While some may argue that the rule is necessary as a course to
achieve uniformity in the face of the insistence of the federal government
and many state legislatures, close analysis renders the validity of the
argument .suspect. There is little in the federal cases to justify the charge
that federal courts ignore good sense to fashion law favorable to govern-
ment agencies. In fact, the cases support the contrary view. On the other
hand, the insistence of state legislatures is very real, but no more real than
the insistence of other state legislatures and state courts to the contrary.
The attempt to effect uniformity through the farm products exception
has not succeeded. It is abundantly clear that in the face of results which
strike courts and legislatures as unfair, the farm products rule falls.
Furthermore, the Code itself through the "or otherwise" language of
section 9-306(2), and the documents of title rules of sections 7-503 and 7-
404, provides ample inroads against the rule for the imaginative and
resourceful lawyer or judge, thereby further increasing disuniformity.
What is more, the farm products exception has resulted in a strong line of
cases which seriously misconstrue the Code's course of dealing provi-
sion and other Code sections.
The farm products exception has bred sprawling diversity through
legislation, common law exceptions, and provisions within the Code
itself. The review committee's recommendation that the exception be
optional or be deleted altogether was a realistic alternative which, while
not achieving the unobtainable uniformity, would have gone far in avoid-
ing the baleful consequences the rule has fostered. In brief, such change
would remove unnecessary fetters on farm financing and would permit
commerce in agricultural commodities to assume its place in the open
market.
